Sven Torfi nn / Panos Pictures
There has been a great deal of research on the causes of war, but very
little on the causes of peace. Since the end of the colonial era there have
been fewer and fewer international wars, while the last 15 years have
seen a dramatic decline in civil wars. Why.
Why the Dramatic Decline
in Armed Conflict.
P A R T V
Why the Dramatic Decline
in Armed Conflict.
Introduction
The decline of international war
148
The decline in the number of international wars since the late 1970s is associated with the
demise of colonialism and the end of the Cold War. But nuclear deterrence, the spread of democ-
racy and a growing acceptance of international law may also have helped keep the peace.
The rise and decline of civil war
150
After World War II there was an unprecedented increase in the number of civil wars. But in the
1990s the number of civil wars declined even more dramatically. More democracy, less poverty
and less ethnic discrimination may be part of the explanation. But the most important factor was
the end of the Cold War.
Conclusion
155
Since the end of the Cold War the UN has led an upsurge of international activism that has
played a critical role in reducing the number of violent conflicts.
P A R T V
H U M A N S E C U R I T Y R E P O R T 2 0 0 5
146
Introduction
The post– World War II era witnessed an extra-
ordinary increase in the number of wars—most
of them civil wars. This was followed by a steep
decline after the end of the Cold War.
Part V of this report reviews some of the findings
that will be presented in greater detail in the Human
Security Report 2006. It focuses on the causes of the
recent decline in global conflict, and addresses two key
questions:
How do we explain the decline in the use of force
in relations between states since the end of the colo-
nial era.
What brought about the remarkable post–Cold War
decline in wars within states.
Strangely, neither of these important trends has been
the subject of much scholarly investigation. ‘For every
thousand pages on the causes of war,’ historian Geoffrey
Blainey has noted, ‘there is less than one page directly on
the causes of peace.’
1
Blainey may have overstated his case, but there is no
doubt that scholars have generally been more interested
in explaining the drivers of war than the determinants of
peace. This is particularly true with respect to the remark-
able post–Cold War decline in civil wars.
In the past 30 years three remarkable changes in in-
ternational politics have had a major—and mostly posi-
tive—impact on global security.
First, by the early 1980s, wars of liberation from colo-
nial rule, which had made up between 60% and 100% of
the international wars occurring in any one year from the
beginning of the 1950s to the end of the 1970s, had virtu-
ally ceased.
2
The security import of this change is as profound as
it is rarely acknowledged. Between 1816 and 2002 there
were some 81 wars of colonial conquest and subsequent
struggles for independence from colonial rule.
3
With the
demise of colonialism one of the major drivers of interna-
tional conflict had simply disappeared.
By the early 1980s, wars of
liberation from colonial rule
had virtually ceased.
Second, the end of the Cold War removed another
major cause of armed conflict from the international
Paul Smith / Panos Pictures
H U M A N S E C U R I T Y R E P O R T 2 0 0 5
147
H U M A N S E C U R I T Y R E P O R T 2 0 0 5
148
system. Approximately one-third of all wars in the post–
World War II period had been driven wholly, or in part, by
the geopolitics of the Cold War.
4
The end of the political confrontation between East
and West in the late 1980s not only removed the only
real threat of war between the major powers, but also
meant that Washington and Moscow stopped support-
ing ‘proxy wars’ in the developing world. Denied the ex-
ternal assistance that had long sustained them, many
of these conflicts simply petered out, or were ended by
negotiated settlements.
Third, the end of the Cold War set off an explosion of
international activism directed toward stopping ongoing
wars and preventing wars that had ended from starting up
again. This little-analysed but critically important develop-
ment appears to offer the most compelling explanation for
the steep decline in warfare that started in 1992.
Part V uses a different dataset from those reviewed
earlier in this report. The dataset is based on information
going back nearly 200 years and deals only with wars.
5
It
does not include data on the less deadly ‘minor’ armed
conflicts that are part of the Uppsala/PRIO dataset fea-
tured in Part I of this report. Despite the differences,
the post–World War II conflict trends are very similar in
both datasets.
The decline of international war
A newly revised dataset tracks the number of
wars since the Congress of Vienna ended the
Napoleonic era in 1815. The decline of interna-
tional war that began in the 1980s is associated
with the end of wars of liberation from colonial
rule and the end of the Cold War.
Between 1816 and 2002 there were 199 international
wars (including wars of colonial conquest and liberation)
6
and 251 civil wars—one international war on average for
every 1.3 civil wars over the entire period.
7
International wars accounted for one-fifth to three-
quarters of all wars being waged in the 1950s, 1960s and
1970s. As Figure 5.1 shows, the anti-colonial struggles and
then the conflicts related to the Cold War came to an end,
8
the
total number of international wars declined both absolutely
and relatively.
From the early 1980s to the early 1990s the number of
international wars declined. For the rest of the 1990s and
the early years of the 21st century there have been almost
no international wars. The one exception was 1999, when
there were three wars—two of which, Kosovo and India-
Pakistan, had relatively small death tolls.
9
How do we explain this drop in the number of interna-
tional wars. Much of the research on the causes of interna-
tional peace over the past 20 years has used large datasets
and statistical inference models to examine the ‘correlates
of war’—the economic, political and sociological factors
associated with interstate war—and peace. This research
points to a number of long-term global trends that are as-
sociated with reduced risks of international conflict:
A dramatic increase in the number of democra-
cies. In 1946, there were 20 democracies in the world;
in 2005, there were 88.
10
Many scholars argue that
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Source: Human Security Centre, 2005
1 1
There is no obvious trend in the number of in-
ternational wars until the end of the 1970s. But
following the end of colonialism and then the
Cold War, the number declined dramatically.
(
The graph shows the annual number of wars expressed as a five-year
moving average.)
1 2
Figure 5.1 International wars, 1816–2002
H U M A N S E C U R I T Y R E P O R T 2 0 0 5
149
this trend has reduced the likelihood of internation-
al war because democratic states almost never fight
each other.
An increase in economic interdependence. Greater
global economic interdependence has increased the
costs of cross-border aggression while significantly re-
ducing its benefits.
13
A decline in the economic util ity of war. The most
effective path to prosperity in modern economies is
through increasing productivity and international
trade, not through seizing land and raw materials.
In addition, the existence of an open global trad-
ing regime means it is nearly always cheaper to buy
resources from overseas than to use force to ac-
quire them.
Growth in international institutions. The greatly
increased involvement by governments in interna-
tional institutions can help reduce the incidence of
conflict. Such institutions play an important direct role
in building global norms that encourage the peaceful
settlement of disputes. They can also benefit security
indirectly by helping promote democratisation and in-
terdependence.
Greater global economic inter-
dependence has increased the costs
of cross-border aggression while
reducing its benefits.
These interrelated and mutually reinforcing trends
have given rise to what is often referred to as the ‘liberal
peace’—a transnational security system that is credit-
ed with having created an unprecedented 60 years of
peace within Western Europe, indeed between all the
liberal democracies.
14
The liberal peace thesis is challenged by many tradi-
tional strategic analysts who believe that security is achieved
through credible deterrence, effective war-fighting capa-
bilities and—especially for smaller powers—membership
of alliances.
15
From this perspective the unprecedented pe-
riod without war between the European powers that fol-
lowed the end of World War II had more to do with mutual
solidarity against a common communist threat than with
democracy or economic interdependence.
Anti-violence norms are often
transgressed and they are more
entrenched in some regions than in
others, but they play an important
role in constraining behaviour.
In fact, the long period without war between the major
powers since World War II is likely a function of both the
growth of the institutions and processes stressed by the
liberal peace theorists, and the impact of traditional ‘peace
through strength’ deterrence policies—in particular the
caution-inducing effect that nuclear weapons had on rela-
tions between East and West.
The power of ideas: A war-averse world
A quite different explanation for the decline in inter-
state war stresses neither the role of liberal economic
and political institutions, nor military deterrence, but
a gradual normative shift against the use of violence in
human relationships.
16
Among the key indicators of this general shift in at-
titudes, one that has been underway for several centu-
ries, are the outlawing of human sacrifice, witch-burning,
lynching, slavery, vigilantism, duelling, war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide.
These anti-violence norms are often transgressed,
of course, and they are more entrenched in some re-
gions than others, but they play an important role in
constraining behaviour. They also inform the creation of
laws and institutions—which in turn can provide the
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to help en-
courage compliance.
Nowhere is this nor mative shift more evident than
in changing public attitudes toward war. Prior to the
H U M A N S E C U R I T Y R E P O R T 2 0 0 5
150
20th century, warfare was a normal part of human ex-
istence. For governments, war was simply an instrument
of statecraft.
Today the forcible acquisition of territory is universally
perceived as a blatant transgression of international law,
and resort to force against another country is only per-
missible in self-defence, or with the sanction of the UN
Security Council.
There has been a similar change in attitudes to co-
lonialism. While colonial subjugation is now universally
abhorred, such conquests were once accepted as a normal
part of empire and were often depicted as morally justi-
fied, in that they brought the benefits of civilisation to
the colonised.
Ideologies that glorify violence and see war as a no-
ble and virtuous endeavour are today notable mostly by
their absence. Insofar as similar ideologies still exist they
are mainly found not in governments but in small, fanati-
cal, terrorist organisations, such as those associated with
al-Qaeda. In addition, the sort of hyper-nationalism that
drove Nazi German and Imperial Japanese aggression in
the 1930s and 1940s is now extremely rare.
Some scholars argue that the rise of war-averse senti-
ment in the industrialised countries has been the critical
factor in the worldwide decline in international war.
17
The reason that liberal democracies live in peace, ac-
cording to this view, is not because they have democratic
modes of government, but because their leaders and peo-
ples have become more averse to war.
From this perspective, interdependence and the rapid
growth of membership in international institutions are a
consequence of the peace achieved by increased war-aver-
sion, not its causes.
18
While the rival merits of the different explanations
of the decline in international conflict are subject to in-
tense debate within the scholarly community, they are
not necessarily contradictory. The problem with them all
is that while they surely point to changes that are likely
to enhance security in the long run, none can account
for the steep decline in international wars between 1980
and 2002.
Countries didn’t become dramatically more interde-
pendent in this period; war didn’t suddenly become more
costly; nor was there a huge increase in membership in
international institutions. And a global increase in anti-war
sentiment around the world can’t explain the decline, for
while international wars declined from 1980 to the begin-
ning of the 1990s, civil wars increased dramatically during
this period (Figure 5.2).
The evidence suggests that the end of colonialism trig-
gered the decline in international wars that started in the
early 1980s, and that the end of the Cold War ensured that
it continued.
The rise and decline of civil war
Civil wars were rare in the immediate aftermath
of World War II , but over the next four decades
they increased in number at an unprecedented
rate. This increase was followed by a more rapid
decline. The Col d War—and its ending—was a
critical determinant of the changes.
The most dramatic changes in the incidence of war-
fare in the past two centuries have taken place in the last
60 years and relate to changes in civil war (also known as
intrastate war).
The number of civil wars taking place around
the world increased from two in 1946 to 25 in 1991.
19
Prior to World War II the maximum number of civil
wars in the world in any one year had never exceeded 10.
(Note that because Figure 5.2 shows five-year moving
averages the highest totals for particular years will not
be shown.)
As Figure 5.2 shows, the escalation in the number of
civil wars from 1946 to 1991 was by far the largest in the
entire 1816 to 2002 period. This remarkable increase was
due mainly to the rise in Cold War–related conflicts and
to struggles for control over the new states created by the
end of colonialism.
The decline in civil war numbers that began after
1992 was steeper than the considerable increase from
H U M A N S E C U R I T Y R E P O R T 2 0 0 5
151
1946 to 1992. In just 10 years, the number of civil wars fell
by 80%.
20
The decline in civil wars is due in large part to changes
wrought by the end of the Cold War. But before discussing
these changes in detail, four other potential explanations
are considered.
The end of colonialism contributed
to an increase in civil wars.
The end of colonialism
The often violent demise of colonial rule around the world
removed a major driver of war from the international sys-
tem. However, this change did not reduce the number
of civil wars. These continued to rise rapidly in number
throughout the 1980s. Part of the reason for this was that
in many newly independent countries the stuggle against
colonialism was replaced by wars over who should control
the post-colonial state.
The end of colonialism contributed to an increase
rather than a decrease in the number of civil wars. But
not only were new post-colonial stugg les being waged,
throughout the 1980s many civil wars were being pro-
longed by continued support from the superpowers and
their allies.
Democratisation
Established democratic states almost never go to war
against each other; they also have a very low risk of suc-
cumbing to civil war.
The number of democracies increased by nearly half
between 1990 and 2003 (Figure 5.3),
22
while the number of
civil conflicts declined sharply over the same period. Can
the surge in democratisation explain the decline. The evi-
dence suggests that this is unlikely.
The risk of civil war is indeed low in stable and in-
clusive democracies, but countries with governments that
are partly democratic and partly authoritarian—dubbed
‘anocracies’ by political scientists—are more prone to civil
war than either democracies or autocracies.
23
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Source: Human Security Centre, 2005
2 1
Driven by Cold War politics and struggles for
control of the post-colonial state, civil wars
soared after World War II, then declined even
more rapidly after the end of the Cold War.
(
The graph shows the annual number of wars expressed as a five-year
moving average.)
Figure 5.2 Civil wars, 1816–2002
Democracies
Autocracies
Anocracies
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Source: Marshall and Gurr, 2005
2 4
The number of democratic regimes increased
consistently in the 1990s. But any security
benefits from this change were likely offset
by the increase in the number of ‘anocracies’—
regimes that are neither democratic nor auto-
cratic, and which are associated with a higher
risk of civil war.
Figure 5.3 The rising tide of democratisation
H U M A N S E C U R I T Y R E P O R T 2 0 0 5
152
This finding is important. While the number of inclu-
sive democracies increased dramatically as the Cold War
wound down, so too did the number of anocracies. So it is
likely that the positive impact on global security of more
democracies was offset by the negative impact of the in-
crease in risk-prone anocracies.
State capacity
Levels of economic development and the risk of war are
strongly related (Figure 5.4). Indeed, one of the most
striking findings to emerge from conflict research is that
most wars take place in poor countries, and that as per
capita income increases, the risk of war declines.
This doesn’t, of course, mean that the poor are inher-
ently more violent than the rich. Indeed, the key factor here
does not appear to be per capita income as much as state
capacity. Other things being equal, the higher the per cap-
ita income a country has, the stronger and more capable
its government. This in turn means more state resources to
crush rebels and to redress grievances.
The pursuit of equitable economic growth would thus
appear to be an effective long-term strategy for enhanc-
ing security, in addition to being a necessary condition for
sustainable human development.
But while there is no doubt that growth in state in-
come and capacity is associated with a reduced risk
of armed conflict in the long term, neither factor can
explain the major decline in civil wars since the ear-
ly 1990s. The rate of economic growth in this period
is simply too slow to account for such a rapid drop in
conflict numbers.
Ethnic discrimination and conflict
Ethnic conflict has been the subject of intense scholarly
scrutiny in recent years. A new analysis by the M inorities at
Risk project at the University of Maryland argues that ‘high
levels of political discrimination are a key cause of violent
ethnic conflict’ and that there has been a steady decline in
political discrimination by governments around the world
since 1950.
26
In 1950, some 45% of governments around the world
actively discriminated against ethnic groups; by 2003, that
share had shrunk to 25%. Economic discrimination by gov-
ernments followed a similar trend.
27
The decline in official discrimination has also been
paralleled by a long-term rise in government-sponsored
positive discrimination/affirmative action programs for eth-
nic minorities around the world. This appears to be part
of a broader normative shift toward greater recognition of
minority rights and away from seeking to resolve political
conflicts by force.
Other things being equal, the higher
the per capita income a country
has, the stronger and more capable
its government. This in turn means
more state resources to crush rebels
and to redress grievances.
But while this is clearly a trend that enhances
security in the long term, it cannot explain the sharp
Per capita gross domestic p roduct in $US
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
Source: Humphreys and Varshney, 2003
2 5
Poverty is associated with weak state capacity.
The greater the poverty and the lower the state
capacity, the higher the risk of war.
Figure 5.4 The association between
war and poverty
H U M A N S E C U R I T Y R E P O R T 2 0 0 5
153
decline in armed conflicts—including ethnic conflicts—in
the 1990s.
28
The security-enhancing effect of the steady reduction
of political and economic discrimination was not strong
enough to offset the rapid increase in civil wars from the
1950s to the early 1990s. And there is no evidence to sug-
gest that after the end of the Cold War the reduction in
discrimination suddenly became a powerful enough force
to account for the decline in conflict numbers.
29
The explanation for the dramatic drop in political vio-
lence in the 1990s has to be related to other changes that
took place during, or immediately preceding, this period.
The end of the Cold War
The most persuasive explanation for the decline in civil
conflict is found in the far-reaching political changes
wrought by the end of the Cold War.
What were the forces that drove the decline.
First, as already noted, the end of the Cold War removed
a major driver of ideological hostility from the international
system. This affected civil wars as well as international wars.
Second, the end of the Cold War meant that the two
superpowers largely stopped supporting their clients in
proxy wars in the developing world. Denied this support,
many of these conflicts died out, or the parties sued for
peace. But less than 20% of the post–Cold War decline in
conflict numbers appears to be attributable to this factor.
30
Third, and most important, the end of the Cold War
liberated the UN, allowing it for the first time to play an
effective global security role—and indeed to do far more
than its founders had originally envisaged.
31
The impact of
this wave of post–Cold War activism on the global security
front—which went well beyond the UN—has been both
profound and the subject of extraordinarily little study.
The upsurge of international activism
Since the end of the 1980s, the UN has spearheaded a re-
markable, if often inchoate, upsurge in conflict manage-
ment, conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding
activities by the international community. The World Bank,
donor states and a number of regional security organisa-
tions, as well as literally thousands of NGOs, have both
complemented UN activities and played independent pre-
vention and peacebuilding roles of their own.
The extent of the changes that have taken place over
the last 15 years
32
is as remarkable as it is under-reported:
A dramatic increase in preventive diplomacy and
peacemaking activities . UN preventive diplomacy
missions (those that seek to prevent wars from break-
ing out in the first place) increased from one in 1990 to
six in 2002.
33
UN peacemaking activities (those that seek to stop on-
going conflicts) also increased nearly fourfold—from
four in 1990 to 15 in 2002 (Figure 5.5).
The increase in preventive diplomacy helped prevent a
number of latent conflicts from crossing the threshold
into warfare, while the rise in peacemaking activities
has been associated with a major increase in negoti-
ated peace settlements. Approximately half of all the
peace settlements negotiated between 1946 and 2003
have been signed since the end of the Cold War.
34
The
average number of conflicts terminated per year in the
1990s was more than twice the average of all previous
decades from 1946 onwards.
An increase in international support for UN peace-
making. The number of ‘Friends of the Secretary-
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
1
Source: UN Department of Political Affairs, 2003
3 5
A dramatic increase in UN peacemaking activi-
ties followed the end of the Cold War.
Figure 5.5 UN peacemaking activities, 1989–2002
H U M A N S E C U R I T Y R E P O R T 2 0 0 5
154
General’, ‘Contact Groups’ and other mechanisms
created by governments to support UN peacemak-
ing activities and peace operations in countries in—or
emerging from—conflict increased from 4 in 1990 to
more than 28 in 2003, a sevenfold increase.
36
An increase in post-conflict peace operations.
There has been a major increase in complex peace op-
erations, not just UN missions, but those of regional
organisations as well. These have involved an ever-
growing range of peacebuilding activities that are
designed in part to prevent the recurrence of conflict.
Since 40% of post-conflict countries relapse into po-
litical violence within five years,
37
any policy initiatives
that can minimise this risk will in turn reduce the risk of
future wars.
The number of UN peacekeeping operations more
than doubled between 1988 and 2004—from 7 to 16
(Figure 5.6).
The peace operations of the post–Cold War era are
not merely larger and more numerous than Cold War
peacekeeping missions, they are also far more ambi-
tious. Whereas the Cold War missions typically in-
volved little more than monitoring ceasefires, many of
today’s operations are more akin to nation building.
A recent RAND Corporation study found that de-
spite the much-publicised failures, two-thirds of UN
nation-building missions examined were successful.
This compared with a 50% success rate for comparable
US missions.
39
A much greater willingness to use force. The Security
Council has been increasingly willing to authorise
the use of force to deter ‘spoilers’ from undermining
peace agreements and in so doing to restart old con-
flicts. UN peace operations are now routinely man-
dated to use force to protect the peace, not just their
own personnel.
40
An increased resort to economic coercion. Since the
end of the Cold War the Security Council has been in-
creasingly willing to impose economic sanctions—the
other coercive instrument in the council’s armoury. The
number of UN sanctions on regimes increased more
than fivefold between 1990 and 2000.
41
Sanctions can
help deny warring parties access to arms and can pres-
sure recalcitrant regimes—and rebel groups—to enter
peace negotiations.
An a ssault on the culture of impunity. In addition to
the establishment of the International Criminal Court
and the various UN and ad hoc tribunals, the number
Countries prosecuting agents of previous regimes for grave human rights abuses
Hybrid and international criminal tribunals
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Source: Human Security Centre, 2005
4 2
The ending of the Cold War was associated
with an increase in national and international
prosecutions of perpetrators of grave human
rights abuses.
Figure 5.7 Numbers of international tribunals
and countries prosecuting grave human rights
abuses, 1970–2004
25
20
15
10
5
0
Source: Human Security Centre, 2005
3 8
The end of the Cold War led to a steep increase
in UN peacekeeping operations. Peace opera-
tions now play a critical role in rebuilding war-
shattered societies and in preventing peace
agreements from breaking down.
Figure 5.6 UN peacekeeping operations,
1948–2004
H U M A N S E C U R I T Y R E P O R T 2 0 0 5
155
of governments prosecuting agents of former regimes
for grave human rights abuses increased from 1 to
11 between 1990 and 2004 (Figure 5.7 ). If would-be
perpetrators of gross human rights abuses believe
there is a real prospect that they will be brought
to justice they may be deterred from acting in the
first place.
43
A greater emphasis on reconciliation. The number
of truth and reconciliation commissions in operation
in any one year has more than doubled since the end
of the Cold War—from one in 1989 to seven in 2003.
44
Pursuing reconciliation rather than revenge in post-
conflict societies reduces the risk of renewed violence.
Reconciliation is also a major aim of most peacebuild-
ing programs.
Addressing the root causes of conflict. The UN, the
World Bank along with other international agencies
and donor governments are increasingly designing
development and aid policies that address what are
perceived to be the root causes of political violence.
Individually, none of these policies has had a great
impact on global security. Most have achieved only mod-
est success in terms of their own goals. But taken together,
their impact has been highly significant.
Overall, this surge of international activism provides
the single best explanation for the extraordinary decrease
in civil wars around the world since the 1990s.
Conclusion
The evidence and analysis briefly reviewed here support
the following conclusions:
International wars are extremely rare today and are
likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The
reasons for this include the factors identified by pro-
ponents of the liberal peace, the caution-inducing
existence of nuclear weapons, the spread of the norm
of war-aversion and the growing acceptance of norms
prohibiting the use of force except in self-defence or
when authorised by the Security Council.
The sharp decline in international wars since the
end of the 1970s is best explained not by institutions,
structures and processes, which change slowly, but by
the two dramatic shifts in global politics during this
period—namely the demise of colonialism and the
end of the Cold War.
The civil war story is quite different. Over the long
term, the evidence suggests that the risk of civil con-
flict is reduced by equitable economic growth, good
governance and inclusive democracy. Development, in
other words, appears to be a necessary condition for
security, just as security is a necessary condition for de-
velopment.
The 80% decline in the most deadly civil conflicts num-
bers that has taken place since the early 1990s owes little
to any of the above factors, however.
45
Here the evidence
suggests the main driver of change has been the extraordi-
nary upsurge of activism by the international community that
has been directed toward conflict prevention, peacemaking
and peacebuilding.
This last point is both the most surprising and the
least examined.
46
The evidence that international activism
has been the main cause of the post–Cold War decline in
armed conflict is persuasive, but thus far it is mostly cir-
cumstantial. A lot more research is required to determine
which specific activities and mechanisms have been most
effective in bringing about the recent improvement in
global security—and under what conditions.
The Human Security Report 2006 will provide a more
detailed analysis of these trends and the data that support
them. It will also examine the counter-trends that, if not
addressed, may pose a major threat to global security in
the long term.
H U M A N S E C U R I T Y R E P O R T 2 0 0 5
156
part V
ENDNOTES
1. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988).
2. Becau se colonial wars are not between states, but between an external state and an indigenous liberation army, they are
referred to by many scholars as ‘extra-systemic’ conflicts.
3. This est imate is drawn from tables in Kristian Gleditsch, ‘A Revised List of Wars Between and Within I ndependent States,
1816–2002’, International Interact ions 30 (2004): 231–262. The Gled itsch d ataset is a revised version of the Correlates of
War d ataset.
4. Ibid.
5. Wars are defined in this dataset as conflicts that result in 1000 or more battle-deaths and in which at least one of the warring
parties is a government.
6. Kristian Gleditsch,
‘A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816–2002’. The term ‘international war’
as opp osed to ‘interstate war’ is used because the dataset includes anti-colonial struggles which do not, strictly speaking,
involve two or more governments.
7. Ibid.
8. Some anti-colonial conflicts were, of course, related to the Cold War.
9. The third war in 1999 was that between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
10. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2005, Center for International Development and Conflict
cessed 20 July 2005).
11. Based on data in Kristian Gleditsch, ‘A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816–2002’.
12. Note that while five-year moving average graphs show trends more clearly than single-year graphs, they tend to obscure
some annual changes.
13. Bruce Ru ssett and John O’Neal, Triangulating Pe ace: De mocracy, Interde pendence and Inte rnational Organizations (New
York: WW Norton, 2001). Some critics object to this argu ment noting (correctly) that pre-war relationships between
Germany and the cou ntries it at tacked were characterised by a high degree of economic interdependence, but t hat t his
did not prevent German aggression. This sort of criticism misses the point. The fact t hat some incentives for going to war
have been reduced does not mean other drivers may not, on occasion, impel cou ntries into war. Reducing the risk of war
is not the same as eliminating it.
14. Ibid.
15. John Mearsheimer and Christopher Layne in Michael E. Brown et al., eds., Theories of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1998).
16. John Mueller, The Remnants of War (Ithaca: Cornell Univeristy Press, September 2004).
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Kristian Gleditsch, ‘A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816–2002’. Note that while these fig-
ures refer only to civil (or intrastate) wars, the patterns are very similar to the intrastate conflict trends seen in the Uppsala/
PRIO dataset discussed in Part I.
20. Ibid. If all civil conflicts involving a state are considered—that is, all civil conflicts resulting in at least 25 battle-related
deaths per year as opposed to only those resulting in at least 1000 battle-deaths—there is nearly a 40% decline over the
same period.
21. Based on data in Kristian Gleditsch, ‘A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816–2002’.
22. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2005.
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23. See Hĺvard Hegre, Scott Gates, Nils Petter Gleditsch, et al., ‘Toward a Democratic Civil Peace. Democracy, Political Change,
24. Monty G. Marshall and Teb Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2005.
25. Macartan Humphreys and Ashutosh Varshney, ‘Violent Conflict and the Millennium Development Goals: Diagnosis and
Recommend ations’, 1st draft, background paper prepared for the meeting of the Millennium Development Goals Poverty
26. Victor Asal and Amy Pate, ‘The Decline of Ethnic Political Discrimination, 1950–2003’ in Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert
Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2005.
27. Ibid.
28. For data on the increase and subsequent decline in ethnic conflicts see Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr and Deepa
Khosla, Peace and Conflict 2001, Center for International Development and Conflict Management (College Park, MD:
29. Clearly, not all conflicts are ethnic conflicts.
30. This approximate percentage was established by a review conducted by the Human Security Centre of all the conflicts that
have ended since 1989. About half these conflict terminations started after the Cold War was over.
31. The UN was established in an era when civil conflict was extremely rare. This is reflected in the language of the Charter
which assigns to the Security Council the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security but con-
tains no provisions for dealing with civil war. Indeed, Article 2.7 of the UN Charter precludes UN intervention in ‘matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’. The Charter also contains no reference to peacekeeping,
let alone peacebuilding. However, since 1989 the UN has become increasingly involved in activities that address conflicts
within states.
32. References for these figures will be presented in the Human Security Report 2006.
33. Data provided by the UN Department of Political Affairs.
34. This finding comes from a new dataset on conflict termination created by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program that was com-
missioned by the Human Security Centre and will be reviewed in detail in the Human Security Report 2006.
35. Data provided by the UN Department of Political Affairs.
36. Calculations based on data in Teresa Whitfield,
‘A Crowded Field: Groups of Friends, the United Nations and the Resolution
of Conflict’, a paper reflecting work in progress for an upcoming book, New York, April 2005.
37. Paul Collier and Anke Hoef.er, ‘The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War’, Copenhagen Consensus
July 2004).
cessed 22 July 2005).
39. Rand Corporation, ‘Rand Study Says UN Nation Building Record Compares Favourably with the US in Some Respects’,
40. Data provided by Peter Wallensteen and Patrik Johansson, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University,
2003.
41. United Nations,
‘Use of sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter’, Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General
42. Data compiled by the Human Security Centre, from a wide variety of p rint and online sources.
H U M A N S E C U R I T Y R E P O R T 2 0 0 5
158
43. However, some argue that threats of prosecution mean that those responsible for the crimes in question will be less likely
to give up power.
44. Data compiled by the Human Security Centre, from a wide variety of print and online sources. Note that some commissions
are truth commissions while others are both truth and reconciliation commissions.
45. Kristian Gleditsch, ‘A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816–2002’.
46. Notable exceptions are found in the work of Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall of the University of Maryland and
Peter Wallensteen of Uppsala University.
